William Clarke Quantrill - Developer of Modern Guerrilla Warfare

          What is unknown to most historians that has great significance on history is the story of Ho Chi Minh the leader of Vietnam during the Vietnam war with the United States. In 1911, Ho Ch Minh came to the United States where he lived in both New York and Boston. While residing in the United States he came into contact with Korean nationalists where he gained his subsequent political outlook. Sometime during the First World War Ho traveled to Missouri and visited the campus of the University of Missouri. While there he studied the historical files of the individual who was at that time and remains the unsurpassed guerrilla leader of all time, William Clark Quantrill.

          With Quantrill being the acknowledged developer of modern guerrilla warfare it was only logical for Ho Chi Minh to have wanted to research Quantrill's tactics and maneuvers so when he returned home he could incorporate Quantrill's tactics against the French colonial forces in control of his country at that time. These very same tactics were used against American forces during the Vietnam conflict after the French were defeated. Ironically American forces used the same tactics against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese in the treacherous jungle terrain during ten years of the war's brutal fighting.

          Guerrilla warfare was first used effectively by Quantrill against Union Forces along the Missouri-Kansas border. Guerrilla warfare in essence is irregular warfare in which a small group of soldiers use military tactics which include ambushes, sabotage, and highly mobile raids in order to fight a larger and less mobile traditional military force. For any guerrilla operation to be successful it must have the support of the local population. Quantrill recruited fighters from plundered neighborhoods. His guerrillas were outdoorsmen who were marksmen, hunters, and horsemen. He developed passwords and signals that only the guerrillas understood and recognized. The guerrillas' friends and relatives lived in their area of operations which in turn supplied them with food, clothing, information, protection and recruits. Quantrill proved highly successful because his men had absolute confidence in their leader.

          Quantrill had gained valuable military experience fighting with the Southern forces in the initial conventional battles of Missouri before he was ordered back to his home county to wage guerrilla warfare against the ever present Union forces. He was instructed to cut off Federal pickets, scouts, and foraging parties. He was also ordered to disrupt the mails and destroy the telegraph lines that kept the Union posts in communication. Building up a sizable force of able bodied and patriotic young fighters Quantrill developed modern guerrilla tactics that earned him the recognition of the most famous guerrilla leader of all times.

          Besides being ably endowed with qualities of leadership he also displayed a remarkable skill of battlefield tactics. Ambushes came to be known as the guerrilla's main forte. Excelling at this maneuver Union forces were cut to pieces and often annihilated by a much smaller body of Southern guerrillas arrayed against them. The principle tactic of Quantrill's successful use of ambushes is still being taught at the Army War College at Fort Leavenworth and instilled into the infantry doctrines of all branches of the United States Armed Forces.

          Quantrill resorted to ambushing to his advantage. To be successful an ambush was set up on the enemy's main supply route or line of communication. If an ambush is well planned and executed with the desirable degree of surprise, the victims are not killed in a 'fair fight'; in fact they do not have the chance to fight at all. The first criterion in planning an ambush is a thorough knowledge of the enemy's tactics. The second requirement is a thorough knowledge of the terrain. Knowing how and where the enemy operates offers a good idea of where and how he can be found and surprised. Quantrill knew when the enemy was likely to be in various portions of his terrain. Knowledge of the enemy and terrain let him pick the time and location of the ambush. His own resources and imagination determined how each of his ambushes was conducted.

          Some positive characteristics of ambushes always applied, notably, surprise and intensive firepower. Quantrill's well-armed men accomplished this with two to eight revolvers apiece besides being armed with shotguns and carbines. Entrance into the ambush site differed than the withdrawal. The flanks of the ambush were anchored to discourage maneuver, reinforcement, or counterattack. Ambushes were always triggered by a prearranged signal. Every man in Quantrill's band also knew the withdrawal route and the rallying point, and everyone wore a distinct mark of recognition. The guerrillas were also adept at noise discipline. Everyone knew what to do once the ambush began, and every guerrilla fired according to the rehearsed plan. They fired at different rates so everyone did not run out of ammunition at the same time, and they had a plan for changing revolver cylinders. They knew if any survivors got out of the kill zone, they had to be pursued by fire and maneuver.

          Before searching bodies for documents, arms, and ammunition, the guerrillas made sure all the enemy were dead. They poured fire into the bodies after they were all down, and they put a bullet into every head. They were careful that this part of the ambush strategy was not ignored. Wounded or soldiers pretending to be wounded could suddenly return fire when the guerrillas' guard was down and inflicting unwanted casualties. Enemy weapons not taken were destroyed. One of their first priorities was to take care of their own wounded. When they got back to their rallying point, they checked their weapons before they ate, slept, or did anything else.

          Ambushing was a tremendous force multiplier and one of the best psychological weapons used in guerrilla warfare. The keys to a perfect ambush were surprise, overwhelming firepower, shock, and the will to kill an unsuspecting stranger without giving him a chance to fight back. When executed by well-trained soldiers, ambushes are the safest of all offensive combat techniques.

          Quantrill's uniform during these guerrilla operations enabled him and his forces to operate at will behind the Union lines. Guerrilla shirts were reminiscent of the garb worn by the Italian freedom fighters led by Giuseppe Garibaldi; a loose-fitting blouse with large breast pockets. The guerrilla shirts were actually a large comfortable blouse that usually had two broad breast pockets. They were immediately recognizable, a distinguishing mark of these men. These 'guerrilla shirts' also demonstrated a kind of flamboyance, pride, and esprit-de-corps. In battle the soldiers would open their jackets to reveal the bright-colored shirts and dare the enemy by presenting themselves as a more recognizable target. Given the practicality of wearing scavenged Union uniforms to be able to operate behind the lines, the flaunting of the "guerrilla shirt" in combat revealed who was friend or foe amid the dust and smoke of close combat.

          The guerrilla shirts were collarless and worn over homespun banded-collared shirts. They all had the same general pattern and cut. Long-waisted, they were gathered about the waist with either a pistol or knife belt. Where a collar would have been, many adoring mothers and sweethearts added patterns and designs of the individual's choosing. The shirts were also highly functional and practical. Designed for close pistol combat on horseback, they were made large enough to be nonbinding. The two large breast pockets were sewed at an angle, without pocket flaps, so the wearer could extract or dispose of extra pistol cylinders without difficulty.

          One of Quantrill's men, guerrilla Hampton Watts recalled: "The prescribed uniform of the guerrilla was a black felt hat, the left brim of which was cocked and fastened to crown by a gold or silver crescent pin to which was suspended by a small cross; this pin also held in place a large black plume, which hung gracefully over the back rim; a black velvet over-shirt, the breast cut 'V' shape and embroidered in colored flowers; the pants worn were of any dark material, the bottoms being stuffed inside cavalry boots; on the heel of each boot was buckled a Mexican spur. The hair of each man was allowed to grow six to eight inches in length, being brushed straight back from the forehead, the ends reaching the top of the shoulders. The arms carried were usually four 'Colt's Navy' revolvers on the belt and two holster revolvers at the horn of the saddle. When in line, mounted on the finest of horses, the band certainly gave a 'Knightly' appearance." No man was without a hat for long. The regulation Union army headgear known as the kepi was never found among guerrillas, instead a wide brimmed slouch hat was worn.

          In the field, they approached oncoming horseman with suspicion. They knew most of the Federal soldiers by name and even knew the Federal regiments by the shoes of their horses. They could even tell the nationality of troops by the manner that the twigs were broken on their line of march. They were so adept in the woods that they could determine their direction in the dark by noting the moss on the trees. To elude pursuers the guerrillas placed their saddle blankets over the roads then rode their horses over them to mask their trail. With scouts in every neighborhood and spies among the locals, Quantrill's intelligence network was vast and extensive. Signs and countersigns quickly propelled important messages from one county to another. With friends on virtually every farm, jaded horses could be traded for fresh mounts at a moment's notice.

          Quantrill's men were comparable to today's modern soldier. In combat, each guerrilla depended on the fighting abilities of the

man next to him. If the guerrillas found themselves in a tight spot, they depended as much on their comrades' marksmanship and horsemanship as they did their own. In the din of battle, which is now commonly referred to as the 'fog of war,' amid the smoke and noise of personal combat, that which enabled victory was individual training and discipline.

          Besides ambushes Quantrill's men also excelled at conventional battlefield tactics. Constant training and practice made Quantrill's guerrillas adept at hitting a moving target on horseback with either hand. Quantrill's tactic was simple: to force or entice the enemy upon terrain advantageous to the guerrilla's mode of fighting. The most successful of all tactics was to fight the enemy in an expanse of open prairie where he would have to take a volley from a Sharps carbine, usually strapped to the guerrillas' backs, at a distance equal to maximum rifle range. Then the guerrillas would charge on horseback at a full run and be upon the enemy with fire superiority from their blazing pistols before the enemy had time to reload their single-shot weapons. If the enemy broke and ran, the guerrillas rode them down and shot them from their saddles.

          In addition to their weaponry, the guerrillas had a unique wild, frightening Rebel Yell. No two descriptions of the yell are alike; one soldier described it as 'a mingling of Indian whoop and wild-howl.' The Rebel Yell was not like the deep-breasted Northern cheer, which was given in unison to signify an advantage gained. The guerrillas' Rebel Yell was a high, shrill yelp, uttered without concert, and maintained continually at a point when a fight was approaching its climax. It was a corporate cry to evoke further effort from everyone.

          Little has changed in the guerrilla tactics Quantrill first developed during the Civil War. His name will live forever for being the developer of modern guerrilla warfare.

Reference:

Armstrong, Charles L. "Ambushes: Still Viable As a Combat Tactic."           Marine Corps Gazette, July 1990.

Watts, Hamp B. - The Babe of the Company. Democrat-Leader Press,         Fayette, Missouri 1913.

Murphy, Jim, The Boys' War: Confederate and Union Soldiers Talk          About the Civil War. New York, Scholastic, 1991.